For those interested in the history of philosophy of science, logical empiricism holds a special attraction. Like old sepia-toned photographs of ancestors who made our lives possible by surviving wars, emigrations, and the vicissitudes of times gone by, logical empiricism holds the nostalgic allure of the smoky Viennese cafés where much of it took shape some eighty years ago. The setting and the story are irresistible. In the Vienna of Freud, Schoenberg, Wittgenstein, and other twentieth-century luminaries, the philosophers, mathematicians, and logicians making up the Vienna Circle were surrounded by intellectual creativity. They themselves were on the front lines of the century’s exciting developments in physics and logic. The core members included Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Gödel, Philipp Frank, and Otto Neurath, while their colleagues and devotees in Europe and America included Hans Reichenbach, Carl Hempel, Ernest Nagel, and W. V. O. Quine. Until the circle’s dissolution and demise in the early 1930s, these present and future leaders in philosophy met regularly at the University of Vienna and at various cafés to debate their ideas about knowledge, science, logic, and language. As they sipped coffee and lit their pipes, they ignited nothing less than a revolution in philosophy and bequeathed to us the discipline we know today as philosophy of science.

Nostalgia, of course, carries little philosophical weight. Most contemporary philosophers, however much they may appreciate logical empiricism as their profession’s founding movement, agree that in the 1950s and ’60s logical empiricism was revealed to be a catalog of mistakes, misjudgments, and oversimplifications about science and epistemology. Much has changed in philosophy of science. Most visibly, the cafés of
the 1920s have given way to styrofoam coffee cups and fluorescent lights of corporate hotels where philosophers of science, now representing a well-established academic field, convene to network, debate issues, and conduct their business in higher education.

Yet recent research has shown that the profession’s journey from European cafés to corporate hotels involved more than growth in membership, a change of national venue, and improved, revised beliefs about science and epistemology. It also involved sweeping and substantive changes that are only now coming into focus. The more we learn about early logical empiricism – its basic values, goals, methods, and the sense of historical mission shared by some of its practitioners – the more foreign and distant it seems when compared with contemporary philosophy of science. Thus, two general questions continue to drive studies about the Vienna Circle and early logical empiricism: What, precisely, was logical empiricism originally all about? and, the main topic of this book, How did philosophy of science evolve into the very different form it takes today?

Compelling answers to the first question began appearing in the 1970s when historians and philosophers began to recover and interpret the rich history of logical empiricism. With such wide cast of characters, whose specialties lay in philosophy, logic, mathematics, and social science, it has become clear that most early logical empiricists, though not all, were as passionate about problems in culture and politics as they were about technical philosophy and epistemology. Neurath, Carnap, and Frank, in particular, actively sought to forge personal, intellectual, and institutional connections between logical empiricism and various cultural and political institutions and movements in Europe. These include Carnap’s lifelong interest in artificial international languages and Neurath’s work in museums, public education, and the isotype system of visual iconography, whose graphic descendants are now ubiquitous in airports, shopping malls, and other public spaces. Neurath, Carnap, Herbert Feigl, and Hans Reichenbach were invited to lecture at the Bauhaus, while Neurath additionally collaborated with, the Belgian International Congress for Modern Architecture (CIAM); (Faludi 1989, Galison 1990). There were also debates with Marxists (including Lenin) and Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt school (Lenin 1908; Horkheimer 1937; Dahms 1994) as well

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1 For a recent and useful compendium of biographical and philosophical information about the Vienna Circle and its associates, see Stadler 2001. For an overview of the scholarly “rediscovery” of logical empiricism, see Uebel 1991, and of its political aspects, see Heidelberger and Stadler 2003.
as Philipp Frank’s attempts to befriend neo-Thomist critics of scientism and positivism at the annual Conferences on Science, Philosophy and Religion in New York City in the 1940s (Frank 1950). At least two logical empiricists, moreover, did not just debate matters of political theory or national and economic policy. Neurath had a tumultuous and nearly fatal role in the Bavarian socialist revolution of 1919 and was later hired by Moscow for his isotype talents. Hans Reichenbach’s socialist student activism at the University of Berlin cost him his chances of later gaining employment there.²

The Vienna Circle specifically reached out to the wider public to promote their critique of traditional philosophy and to popularize their Wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung, or scientific world-conception, as a replacement. They did so in Vienna through the Ernst Mach Society and its public lectures, and they did so in Europe and America via Otto Neurath’s Unity of Science movement. The movement promoted the task of unifying and coordinating the sciences so that they could be better used as tools for the deliberate shaping and planning of modern life. And it sought to cultivate epistemological and scientific sophistication among even ordinary citizens so that they might better evaluate obscurantist rhetoric from reactionary and antiscientific quarters and better contribute to planning a future unified science that would assist society’s collective goals.

Together, logical empiricism and Neurath’s Unity of Science movement were in the business of Aufklärung (Scott 1987; Uebel 1998). They sought nothing less than to specify and to help fulfill the promise of the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment while taking full advantage of twentieth-century developments in science, logic, social thought, and politics. This constructive, enlightenment agenda is the main subject of this book. For only by once again putting these ambitions of logical empiricism in plain view can we see both how much philosophy of science has changed in the last half of the twentieth century and, in turn, what kinds of conditions and forces were involved in its transformation.

**The Conventional Wisdom about Logical Empiricism**

Before introducing this book’s main thesis, it is helpful to consider some of the conventional – and mostly misleading – wisdom about logical empiricism. Before this recent flowering of interest and research, its cultural

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scope and scientific ambitions were obscured by several circumstances, especially in the English-speaking philosophical world. One factor remains logical empiricism’s attacks on traditional and contemporary metaphysics and pseudoscience. These were vivid displays of analytical fireworks that helped to stamp the project with a negative, eliminative character. In addition, until Neurath’s writings began to be translated and published in English in the 1970s, his constructive interests in unified science and politics and his finely tuned epistemological insights about language and science were obscured by his reputation as the “original neo-positivist caveman” (Uebel 1991, 5) who thumped his club on the ground and muttered Machisms such as “blue here now.” Another factor was the influence of Rudolf Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap 1969), which, however much it naturally and deservedly captures philosophical attention, is wrongly taken as a paradigm for logical empiricism as a whole. Taken together, these and other factors helped to create an impression that logical empiricism, even despite its subsequent liberalizations and changes, was an early, phenomenalistic moment in the history of Western epistemology, and little more.

Popular secondary writings also helped to obscure logical empiricism’s cultural engagements. Karl Popper’s influential Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper 1935) and his widely read essay, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations” (Popper 1969), trumpeted his conceit that he alone diagnosed an inductivist fallacy at logical empiricism’s core (thereby reinforcing the view that its project was essentially, if not also exclusively, epistemological). A. J. Ayer’s even more widely read Language, Truth and Logic (Ayer 1936) presented logical empiricism as mainly Carnapian philosophy of science (up through logical syntax (Carnap 1937c)) viewed through the lens of Wittgensteinian ordinary language philosophy. Philosophy’s point and purpose, and hence logical empiricism’s, Ayer explained, was merely (but not unimportantly) to assist the progress of science, whenever called on, by providing clarifying analyses of scientific language (Ayer 1936, 152). While Ayer’s account was faithful to the movement’s iconoclasm – its rejection of metaphysics, its flirtations with verificationism and foundationalism, and its rejection of a synthetic a priori – it does not mention logical empiricism’s constructive ambitions. Save for two footnotes, Neurath’s voice is missing from Language, Truth and Logic because Ayer sought “to emphasize not so much the unity of science” – the topic and goal dearest to Neurath – “as the unity of philosophy with science” (ibid., p. 151). That logical empiricism was conceived by its founders in part to assist the coordination and coordinated use of
scientific knowledge, to help modernize and improve life, education, and social and economic organization, is a fact no reader of Ayer’s book will surmise.

If Ayer collapsed logical empiricism’s broad agenda into a narrow but active scientific project, by the 1970s logical empiricism was reduced further. No longer a participant in science, it was remembered as a school of commentary about science. Suppe’s compendium *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Suppe 1977), which sits near *Language, Truth and Logic* on every philosopher of science’s bookshelf, presented logical empiricism as a set of propositions about science and its methods. Much as some members of the Vienna Circle feared, as we see below, logical empiricism became, and was remembered as, a sect whose doctrines were verificationism, inductivism, and phenomenalism. Suppe wrote that this narrow, strictly epistemological agenda exhausted logical empiricism’s legacy:

For over thirty years logical positivism . . . provided the basic framework for posing problems about the nature of scientific knowledge and also imposed constraints on what would count as appropriate solutions to these problems: Singular knowledge of directly observable phenomena was nonproblematic, whereas the remaining knowledge science purported to provide was problematic at best. (Suppe 1977, 617)

By the late 1960s when Suppe wrote this, logical empiricism was widely considered defunct and this characterization of the program provided a convenient way to understand its demise. What the program offered for analyzing “the remaining knowledge science purported to provide” were models of explanation, reduction, induction, and confirmation that were themselves found wanting. Two influential works, Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (Quine 1951) and Kuhn’s famous *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Kuhn 1962), were by then helping to solidify consensus. Among other problems, logical empiricism was internally crippled, according to Quine, by the unspecifiability (without moving in a circle) of an analytic-synthetic distinction. According to Kuhn, it was unable to elucidate science’s conceptual holism and the alleged theoretical and linguistic discontinuities that punctuate science’s history and, many presumed, its essential nature. Logical empiricism was in sad shape. It had lost its connections to scientific practice, could hardly stand up under its own conceptual weight, and the science it aimed to interpret was shown by historical research to be merely an idealized fiction existing only in philosophers’ imaginations.
A New Explanation for the Demise of Logical Empiricism

Knowing as we do now that logical empiricism was originally a philosophical project with cultural and social ambitions, the time is ripe to inquire how the discipline was transformed and how these cultural and social ambitions were lost. The answer defended here is that it was transformed during the 1950s at least partly, if not mainly, by political pressures that were common throughout civic as well as intellectual life during the Cold War following World War II. In large part, these pressures led logical empiricism to shed its cultural and social engagements by shedding Neurath’s Unity of Science movement. The movement was not merely a public, scientific front for an otherwise independent philosophical program. It helped to determine which kinds of questions and research topics were pursued, and how they were pursued, at the heart of philosophy of science.

This is not to say that, were it not for the Cold War, contemporary philosophy of science would now be some kind of nonacademic public servant. The claim, rather, is that logical empiricism originally aspired both to technical, philosophical sophistication as well as to engagement with scientists and modern social and economic trends. The Cold War, this book argues, made that agenda impossible and effectively forced the discipline to take the apolitical, highly abstract form remembered in Suppe’s *Structure of Scientific Theories*. The chasm that yawns between that book and the Vienna Circle’s combative manifesto, *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung*, in other words, was created by the Cold War. Nor does this interpretation dismiss the perspicuity of Quine’s, Kuhn’s, and other criticisms of logical empiricism. It does claim, however, that the power of these political forces must be acknowledged and that we begin to assemble, as sketched below, a more complicated and more accurate story of philosophy of science in the twentieth century.

One historiographic (and ultimately metaphysical) aside may help to dismantle a prejudice that this thesis is likely to meet. It comes, appropriately, from Neurath, who, as we see below, fought many battles with other philosophers whose influence and reputation came to overshadow his own. One guiding element in these debates was Neurath’s multifaceted pluralism and, especially, his criticisms of what he called “absolutism.” For example, Neurath criticized Carnap’s and Tarski’s semantic theory of truth (holding, for example, that the statement “the snow is white” is true if and only if the snow is white) on the ground that it erected a dual order in which language speaks first about itself, and then the world,
in order to allow a comparison of these reports and a determination of whether truth-conditions obtain.

Neurath objected because, he insisted, a healthy empiricism cannot ever—even in philosophical abstraction—ignore the practical conditions in which language and science operate. Thus, in his famously cumbersome model of protocol statements—

Otto’s protocol at 3:17 o’clock: [At 3:16 o’clock Otto said to himself: (at 3:15 o’clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto)] (Neurath 1932/33, 93) –

the statement’s outermost report is always about a specific person and what they believe they see and know about the snow or table before them. For Neurath, there is no legitimate dualism of language and the world that a theory of truth may invoke. Knowledge, speech, language, and behavior remain always, as Nancy Cartwright and Thomas Uebel have emphasized for our understanding of Neurath, in the same “earthly plane.”

Here lay, for example, one of Neurath’s antipathies to Popperianism. In Popper’s metaphysics of first, second, and third worlds, the last is populated like Plato’s heaven by objective concepts or objects studied by generations of philosophers and scientists. Pythagoras and contemporary students in seventh grade, Popper reasoned, can know and understand Pythagoras’ theorem as the same thing because it enjoys ontological status as an enduring, timeless object. Neurath would have none of this, and neither will any philosopher who is sympathetic with this book’s political thesis. For if philosophy of science is devoted to the study of anything like such an ontological domain of metaphysical objects or conditions—truth, explanation, confirmation, meaningfulness, analyticity, and so on—the claim that political forces controlled its career in America will always be trumped by the reply that political forces could cause, at most, a temporary diversion in philosophy’s historical development. Politics could never fundamentally change the discipline precisely because political forces cannot (and therefore did not) connect with the otherworldly objects that, as philosophers investigate them, guide philosophical practice.

This multiplication of worlds is fatuous metaphysics, Neurath would say, much as he barked “Metaphysics!” “Metaphysics!” (and later, to save

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3 Cartwright and Uebel 1996. The phrase comes from Neurath, who praised Marxist naturalistic methodology in which “everything lies in the same earthly plane” (Neurath 1928, 295).

4 For more on Neurath’s debate with Popper, see Neurath 1935 and Cat 1995.
his voice, just “M!”) at the Thursday evening meetings of the Vienna Circle.\textsuperscript{5} It is metaphysical for Neurath because it has no place within an honest, empirical, and scientific depiction of philosophy of science as something that (some) human beings do in our earthly plane. Philosophy of science must be conceived as a set of practices, values, goals, and jargons that are chosen, utilized, and (hopefully) improved by individuals for their intellectual pursuits. These practices are taught to others and modified by debate as well as by often undetected historical or sociological pressures. All of these processes and the agents that sustain them exist in the same earthly plane, right alongside culture, society, and politics.

As this book shows, many choices made by first-generation logical empiricists and their students were made alongside intellectual, institutional, and personal pressures arising directly out of the Cold War and McCarthyism. This will explain both how philosophy of science was radically changed and depoliticized by these pressures and how this thesis ought to seem no more implausible than the better known fact that Hollywood movie making was also transformed by McCarthyism. There is neither a heavenly Idea of entertainment that controls the history of cinema nor a timeless, objective domain of intellectual pursuits and values lording over the philosophy of science.

\textbf{The Unity of Science Movement and the \textit{International Encyclopedia of Unified Science}}\textsuperscript{5}

Logical empiricism came to America during the 1930s. With the exception of Herbert Feigl, who emigrated in 1930, the main wave began mid-decade and included Rudolf Carnap in 1935, Karl Menger in 1936, Carl Hempel in 1937, Hans Reichenbach, Felix Kaufman, Gustav Bergmann, and Philipp Frank in 1938, and Kurt Gödel and Edgar Zilsel in 1939 (Stadler 2001). Most came to America as participants in Neurath’s Unity of Science movement. Though Neurath himself never emigrated to America (despite the advice and wishes of his colleagues), he promoted and organized the movement from Holland, and later England,

\footnote{Neurath’s version of this famous anecdote bears repeating. During the “Wittgenstein period,” Neurath recalled in 1944, “again and again” he objected, “this is metaphysics,” during the group discussions of the \textit{Tractatus}. “It became dull and Hahn suggested I should speak of M. only to shorten the sounds and since I too often said M,’ he suggested I should only remark when I am satisfied by saying, NM’ [for not metaphysics’]” (Neurath to Carnap and Morris, November 18, 1944, ASP RC 102-55-06).}
while taking several trips to America as this wave of emigration came ashore. The movement thus became a kind of institutional home-away-from-home for the émigré philosophers, one that helped them maintain the contact, dialogue, and intellectual focus they had provided for each other in Vienna, Berlin, and Prague. As we see below, it also facilitated connections between the émigrés and American philosophers who, in some cases, were already in pursuit of a socially and politically engaged program in philosophy of science.

The Unity of Science movement was also the public, pedagogic, and scientific voice of logical empiricism. It consisted of a series of International Congresses for the Unity of Science (held in Prague, 1934; Paris, 1935; Copenhagen, 1936; Paris, 1937; Cambridge, England, 1938; Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1939; and Chicago, 1941); publications such as the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science and a short-lived English incarnation of Erkenntnis titled the Journal of Unified Science; regular announcements and items appearing in journals such as Philosophy of Science and Synthese, and some coverage in the popular media (such as Time and the New York Times). The logical empiricists were received in America both as representatives of a new social and cultural movement and as intellectuals, philosophers, and logicians.

To contemporary philosophers, the familiar item in this list is the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, which for decades was mentioned on or near the title page of Kuhn’s famous Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Though from its beginning it had an influential life of its own, Kuhn’s book was originally commissioned as a monograph for the Encyclopedia after the task of writing a historical monograph had been passed from the Italian philosopher and historian Federigo Enriques, to George Sarton (who declined), to I. B. Cohen, and, finally, to Kuhn. Though no one has produced a detailed, historical account of how Kuhn’s monograph and its ideas were influenced by the Unity of Science movement, enough has been learned to dismiss one persistent commonplace, namely, that Kuhn refuted logical empiricism, Trojan-horse style.

Kuhn’s book was written in the last years of the 1950s and was published in 1962 when the encyclopedia project was moribund, roughly a decade after its last burst of vitality in the early 1950s (Reisch 1995). Something else, therefore, already killed the Encyclopedia and the larger Unity of Science movement. The culprit is plainly suggested by the dates of the International Congresses listed

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6 This point was impressed on me by Abraham Edel, personal correspondence.
above: The second world war nearly halted the movement, and despite earnest efforts by some of its leaders, pressures of the Cold War prevented it from ever recovering momentum.

Over the course of its history, these leaders were Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, and the American pragmatist philosopher Charles Morris. Morris, at the University of Chicago, was extremely helpful in assisting the emigration of logical empiricism. He lectured and wrote often in the 1930s about the new Unity of Science movement, its cultural and political importance, and its proper place alongside American pragmatism as part of a comprehensive theory of signs. Following Charles Sanders Peirce, Morris called this theory “semiotic” and tirelessly promoted it as the future of philosophy (Morris 1937). At the same time, Morris assisted his colleagues’ emigrations. He first met them in Prague in 1934, at the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy where Neurath held his first meeting on behalf of the Unity of Science movement and the new encyclopedia project. Morris advised those planning to come to America that they should promptly publish an article or book in English before seeking a position in an American college or university. Several took his advice and his offers to help. Morris soon found himself arranging translations, putting authors in contact with publishers, and writing letters to friends and colleagues in the United States who might possibly hire a scientific philosopher. With Morris’s help, Reichenbach found a position at UCLA, Frank took a nontenured position at Harvard, and, in 1936, Carnap arrived at Morris’s University of Chicago (after a one-year position at Harvard). Besides all this activity, as well as his own writing and teaching, Morris enticed the University of Chicago Press to publish Neurath’s new International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.

With good reason, Morris hoped that his university would become the center of the Unity of Science movement in America. From Chicago, he and Carnap edited the Encyclopedia as its monographs began appearing in 1938, while Neurath, its editor-in-chief, lived in Holland. Morris also assumed most of the negotiations with the University of Chicago Press, negotiations that were often complicated and strained, especially those concerning the movement’s plan to rescue Erkenntnis – logical empiricism’s

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8 Morris describes editing a manuscript of Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction in Morris to Reichenbach, June 8, 1937, CMP. “I thank you very much for your continuing efforts to find a position for me in the USA” (Reichenbach to Morris, July 5, 1937, CMP). Morris also helped Philipp Frank to translate and to publish essays prior to his emigration.
original European voice – by purchasing it from the German publisher Felix Meiner (Reisch 1995). Still, despite these and other difficulties, the Encyclopedia was initially a great success. Wary about committing to a long-term project that might not carry its financial weight, the Press agreed to publish the Encyclopedia on the condition that they receive at least 250 advanced subscriptions. That hurdle was easily cleared. Some 500 had been received for the first, introductory unit, titled Foundations of the Unity of Science, which contains the twenty monographs of the Encyclopedia that exist today. Individual monographs were also selling briskly in bookstores. Although they fell behind their original schedule to publish one monograph per month – in part because of Neurath’s distance – the editors were pleased and the Press never doubted its decision to accept the project.

The Encyclopedia and the movement were celebrated in New York City, arguably the midcentury heart of the nation’s intellectual life. John Dewey was the senior philosopher among several, including Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook, Horace Kallen, and Meyer Schapiro, who helped the famous group of New York Intellectuals define the trends and values of the nation’s then highly politicized intellectual life. Some leftist intellectuals and philosophers, to be sure, criticized Neurath and logical empiricists, usually on the grounds that they were not leftist, radical, or dialectical materialist enough. But in the mainstream of New York philosophy, defined by students of Dewey and Morris Cohen, the new philosophical émigrés and their projects were applauded and utilized. Dewey, Hook, and Nagel, for example, variously enlisted logical empiricists and logical empiricism in their battles against neo-Thomism, the popular movement promoted by Mortimer Adler and University of Chicago President Robert Maynard Hutchins (whose own series of monographs, Great Books of the Western World, can be seen as competing with Neurath’s new Encyclopedia). For those who did not socialize or correspond personally with Neurath, Carnap, and the others, they were introduced to logical empiricism and

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9 As of March 31, 1939, some 547 subscriptions and over 1,000 copies of all monographs published had been sold (To William B. Harrell from Bean, March 6, 1939, UCPP, box 346, folder 1). By 1945, roughly 1,800 of each published monograph had been sold (To MDA from JS, January 19, 1945, UCPP, box 346, folder 4).

10 For Neurath to review and edit each monograph, the proofs would have to be mailed to Holland and returned. In addition, Neurath was extraordinarily busy. In 1939, his isotype history of modern life appeared (Neurath 1939). Morris, as well as the Press, were sometimes frustrated by these delays. (See, e.g., Bean to Neurath, April 21, 1938, UCPP, box 348, folder 3.)
Neurath’s movement through articles in *Partisan Review* or by Neurath’s cousin, science writer Waldemar Kaempffert, who praised Neurath and the new *Encyclopedia* in the *New York Times*.

By 1939, the *Encyclopedia* began to take shape. Morris, Neurath, and Carnap persuaded the Press to announce the first nonintroductory unit: six volumes titled *Methods of Science*. In a draft of a prospectus, Morris explained that these volumes would be devoted to specific sciences and problems within them related to the unity of science. As a whole, the volumes would be concerned with the development of a unified scientific language, with the presentation of the results of logical analysis in various sciences, with problems relevant to the foundations of the sciences, with the analysis and interrelation of central scientific concepts, with questions of scientific procedure, and with the sense in which science forms a unified whole.  

Neurath’s plans at the time show how broad and influential he hoped the *Encyclopedia* would be. In the third unit, Morris later recalled, the new encyclopedists would take stock of the “actual state of systematization within the special sciences, and the connections which obtained between them.” Unit four would consist of ten volumes treating education, engineering, medicine, and law. All of these professions, Neurath hoped, would find a home in the Unity of Science movement.  

Morris, Neurath, and Carnap also hoped that specific collaborative methods could be built in to the *Encyclopedia* as it grew and gained momentum. Though the early monographs were mainly read and edited by the three of them, these new monographs, their press-release explained, would be circulated more widely prior to publication: In order to avoid simple misunderstandings, the authors will have an opportunity to discuss each other’s contribution before publication, so that there remains only the kernel of what seem to be genuine differences. In this way the crucial solved and unsolved problems in current methods of science will be made to stand out in various fields and in science as a whole.  

Like scientists, the new encyclopedists would strive to minimize spurious misunderstandings and maximize their collective intellectual power and efficiency.

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11 Morris, prospectus draft, UCPP, box 346, folder 1. This prospectus was never distributed.
12 Morris 1960, 519, 520.
13 Morris, prospectus draft, UCPP, box 346, folder 1.
The International Congresses

The *Encyclopedia* and its collaborative dialogues would also be supported by the International Congresses for the Unity of Science. The first in 1935, held at the Sorbonne in Paris, drew some 170 participants.¹⁴ Besides the leading logical empiricists from Vienna, Prague, and Berlin and their American supporters, the conference drew leading philosophical lights from France, England, Italy, Poland, Scandinavia, and Holland. Session titles included Scientific Philosophy and Logical Empiricism, the Unity of Science (and the new encyclopedia), Language and Pseudoproblems, Induction and Probability, Logic and Experience, Philosophy of Mathematics, Logic, and History of Logic and of Scientific Philosophy. The conference mapped out the wide array of topics that the movement would address for roughly the next five years.

Subsequent congresses sometimes had a narrower focus. The second, in Copenhagen in 1936, was dedicated to philosophy of physics and biology and, in particular, the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. Niels Bohr, the Nobel Prize–winning author of the Copenhagen Interpretation, easily attended since the congress was held at his spacious home (see Figure 1). Though fewer Americans were present (many had spent precious depression dollars a year before to attend in Paris), the cast of characters remained wide and international. The third congress, held again in Paris in 1937, was dedicated to the planning and conception of the *Encyclopedia* and core issues in logical empiricism. Large sessions were held on Unity of Science and Logic and Mathematics, while smaller sessions covered topics in physics, biology, and psychology.

The congresses were increasingly affected by the instabilities and uncertainties that preceded the war. News of Moritz Schlick’s murder by a disturbed student reached his colleagues while they were at the Copenhagen congress, while the Anschluss of Austria to Nazi Germany occurred a few months before the Fourth International Congress. That congress was organized by L. Susan Stebbing and held at Cambridge University in England. It was dedicated (appropriately, given Wittgenstein’s influence in British philosophy) to the topic of scientific language. This was the last congress held outside the United States.

Charles Morris organized the fifth congress at Harvard in 1939. It drew around 200 participants, many from California, Chicago, Harvard, Yale,

¹⁴ This and other information about the International Congresses is usefully presented in Stadler 2001.
and the New York universities. Again, the conference focused on the unity of science thesis and methods for unifying the sciences as well as issues in logic and formal philosophy of science. Morris used the opportunity to broaden the movement and include topics in social science – “socio-humanistic sciences,” he called them – including the scientific study of values pioneered by American pragmatists and urgently emphasized by John Dewey. As the organizer, he published an article prior to the congress in which he detailed his liberalizing agenda (Morris 1938b). But the issues he raised were soon overwhelmed by worldwide political tensions. On the eve of the conference, the participants learned that war in Europe was all but guaranteed. The next day, Horace Kallen of the New School for Social Research, a philosopher who had befriended both Neurath and Morris, presented his surprising thesis that the Unity of Science movement itself
amounted to a kind of authoritarian totalitarianism that was dangerously allied to fascist ideologies in Italy, Spain, and Nazi Germany.

For most, however, the politics of the movement were not totalitarian but rather humanitarian, progressive, and pacifist. In 1941, after war had broken out, Carnap’s student Milton Singer and Reichenbach’s student Abraham Kaplan wrote about the Harvard congress in an article titled “Unifying Science in a Disunified World” (Singer and Kaplan 1941). They detailed the movement’s importance for science and education, and they clearly admired its internationalistic and humanitarian values. Morris conveyed the same attitude in the promotional flyer he wrote for the movement’s sixth and final congress, held at the University of Chicago in 1941: “The Organizing Committee feels that the present world condition enhances rather than restricts the need for the vigorous continuation of the unity of science movement.”15 Given Morris’s broad, humanitarian ambitions for the movement, this congress appropriately featured sessions such as Science and Valuation, Science and Ethics, Historical Topics, and one talk addressing Science and Democracy.16

The War and the Demise of the Movement

The war hampered the encyclopedia project and the activities of the movement in several ways. European authors usually had more important problems to worry about than completing the monographs they had promised to Neurath, and the slowness and unreliability of mail drastically slowed communication among the authors, editors, and the Press. The journal Synthese, which carried a regular “Unity of Science Forum,” like many other European journals ceased publishing until after the war. An even larger hurdle appeared, however, in May 1940 when Neurath narrowly escaped from occupied Holland. Having misjudged how much time he would have to relocate his home and his isotype workshop in advance of the encroaching Nazis, Neurath and his assistant (and future wife) Marie Reidemeister escaped in a small, overcrowded fishing boat they chanced on in Rotterdam just before it shoved off. They drifted until picked up by an English naval ship. Because of their Austrian nationality, they were treated as prisoners of war and spent several months interned in England. Their savior was L. Susan Stebbing, who found them a lawyer

15 Promotional flyer, UCPP, box 346, folder 3.
16 Announcement, “Final Notice: Sixth International Congress for the Unity of Science,” UCPP, box 346, folder 2.
who appealed to authorities for their release and arranged for their marriage. Several months later, with financial and emotional support from Stebbing and other friends and colleagues, the Neuraths settled to live and work in Oxford, England.

Though Neurath was able to resume his editorial duties by the summer of 1941, the project soon floundered again in 1943 when the University of Chicago Press decided to suspend it. With only nine of the twenty monographs published and with Morris and Neurath giving the Press nothing more than promises about monographs in the pipeline, they decided that the project was getting too expensive (paper, for example, was in short supply) and that subscribers were being shortchanged. Monographs were appearing too far behind the announced schedule of one per month, and the Press believed that the substitute authors whom the editors had enlisted were less than first-rate (Reisch 1995).

After receiving the news, Neurath became furious and deftly persuaded the press to change its mind. He made it clear that, if necessary, he could take the *Encyclopedia* to another publisher. Holland would soon be liberated, he surmised, and he could perhaps take the *Encyclopedia* to his “very faithful Dutch Publisher,” Van Stockum & Zoon, who had published the first issue of the movement’s *Journal of Unified Science*. He pressed this notion of being “faithful” to the movement by regarding the *Encyclopedia* as a war effort. He praised what had been the project’s reassuring, “business as usual” spirit, and he reminded them that this “real international enterprise” was sustained “partly by refugees” who would be discouraged and demoralized: “the war is going on very well and victory comes nearer every day. It would be like defeatism to suspend now anything.” Neurath did not choose these most effective words merely for the occasion. He often wrote privately to Morris about the movement in similar terms: “During wartime science and logical analysis cannot rest . . . We have to prepare future peace life, particularly in Europe.” “This nazified Germany and Europe will need some good dishes, we shall present them.”

Obstacles appeared in front of the movement roughly every two years. After the outbreak of war in 1939, Neurath’s internment in 1941, and the Press’s suspension of the *Encyclopedia* in 1943, disaster struck again with news of Neurath’s sudden death in late 1945, days after his sixty-third birthday. Besides the shock and loss to his friends, Neurath died at a critical, unstable time immediately after the war when the profession

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17 Neurath to Morris, January 7, 1942, USMP, box 2, folder 7; Neurath to Morris, December 28, 1942, CMP.
was poised to move and grow in different possible directions. Neurath was in the midst of two separate disputes that, in retrospect, arguably helped to figure the historical outcome. With Carnap, he was mired in an increasingly personal argument that had begun in 1942 with the publication of Carnap’s *Introduction to Semantics* (Carnap 1942). Neurath first complained that the book was filled with unacceptable metaphysics, and the ensuing dispute erupted further in 1943 when Neurath learned that his encyclopedia monograph *Foundations of the Social Sciences* (Neurath 1944) had been printed with a disclaimer, requested by Carnap, saying that Carnap had not edited the monograph. (To help mollify the University of Chicago Press, Morris rushed the monograph into print without Carnap’s having had a chance to edit it.) Neurath took this gesture as a personal insult, the meaning of which was that Neurath and his ideas were second-rate and not worthy of association with Carnap’s highly respected name and work. For Neurath, at least, more than personal feelings were involved, for he was concerned about the formal, abstract direction that philosophy of science was taking, due in no small part, he believed, to the influence and leadership of Carnap. Neurath’s own distinctive interests in empiricism and the unification of the sciences, he worried, were being eclipsed by Carnap’s more formal, “scholastic” style of work.

During the last months of his life, Neurath was also mired in an equally frustrating exchange with Horace Kallen over his charges that logical empiricism and the Unity of Science movement were “totalitarian.” Resuming the debate Kallen had begun in 1939, Neurath could still make little sense of Kallen’s view that logical empiricism was ready-at-hand to assist the march of fascism and totalitarianism. He was even more agitated because Kallen had read some of Neurath’s writings and reported on them as if Neurath quite simply wished to legislate rules and terminological reforms for all of science. Neurath’s project was both more subtle and essentially democratic in its method, though Kallen could not see, and possibly chose not to see, that this was so. From at least two sides, therefore, Neurath felt alienated and increasingly powerless to guide the movement of which he was leader. In the midst of these two stressful disputes, he died suddenly of a stroke in December 1945.

**The Unity of Science Movement in the Cold War**

Given the fatigue of war, the shock and sadness of Neurath’s death, and some ensuing surprises (such as the fact that Neurath had not secured official contracts with his encyclopedia authors), it was not until 1947
that the movement and the Encyclopedia began to stir. This time Philipp Frank, Neurath’s close friend and the philosopher of science whose views and style most matched his own, joined the leadership by helping to re-establish in America the Institute for the Unity of Science that Neurath had maintained in Holland and England. While Frank taught physics and philosophy of science at Harvard, he and Morris circulated plans among their colleagues to re-establish the Institute in Boston. With Frank initially at the helm, the new Institute would decentralize and distribute the movement’s leadership among a changing or cycling roster of officers. This, it was hoped, would help avoid catastrophic breakdowns in leadership in the future and help bring new, younger talent into the movement.

At the time, Morris was traveling and writing as a Rockefeller fellow. He therefore had access to grant officers whom he helped to persuade to support the movement and its new Institute. The Institute would sponsor the Encyclopedia, organize future congresses for the unity of science, and pursue some new projects. Frank, in particular, was eager to promote research in sociology of science and to produce a dictionary of scientific terms. He also organized essay contests to help popularize the Institute and bring students into the fold.

Yet the Institute did not thrive. There were problems with Frank’s leadership, and, more importantly, the very idea of the Institute and its Neurathian mission appears to have lost popularity among important philosophers (including Feigl and Reichenbach), who sought a more technical, less public profile for philosophy of science. As Frank struggled to balance the Institute’s more popular agenda with the more professional agenda of his colleagues, most of the Institute’s projects fell by the wayside. The essay contests were an embarrassing failure, no progress was made toward advancing the sociology of science, and the Institute’s Rockefeller funding lasted only through 1955. Nor did the Institute accelerate or promote the Encyclopedia, which limped along, shouldered by Morris and Carnap, until the last of its twenty monographs appeared in 1970.

One central reason why the Institute and the movement failed to thrive in the early 1950s is that a repressive McCarthyite “climate of fear” swept

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18 University of Chicago Press memorandum, September 13, 1946, UCPP, box 346, folder 4. Reporting conversations between Morris and the Press, the memo notes that in the wake of Neurath’s death, the movement’s “plans are to decentralize the organization” by creating the Institute, which “will probably be headed by Carnap.” Philipp Frank, however, led the effort to establish the Institute and became its president.
through American political, popular, and intellectual landscapes. The climate was so inhospitable and professionally perilous that leaders of the movement, with the exception of Frank, as we see below, effectively chose not to invest their energy and careers in the task of revitalizing the Unity of Science movement. In hindsight, seeds of this change could be detected in the early 1930s as some of the American intellectuals who exalted Marxism and traveled to the Soviet Union to see at first hand the fruits of the revolution began to qualify their beliefs and hopes. In the mid-1930s, the dissenters were still few and the Unity of Science movement was nonetheless admired by the nation’s left intellectuals and philosophers. Still, doubts and worries continued to accumulate through the decade. With the much-admired Trotsky in exile, rampant rumors of collectivization disasters, and Stalin brazenly persecuting his rivals in show trials, the stage was set for a dramatic shift in the intellectual left’s perceptions of Russia. For many it occurred in 1939 with news of the Hitler-Stalin nonaggression pact. The great and glorious revolution, many concluded, had been hijacked by Stalin and a band of thugs aiming to subject the world to their dictatorship. Months later, Hitler invaded Poland and Horace Kallen would denounce his friend Neurath’s Unity of Science movement as “totalitarian.”

Not all leftists so converted to anti-Stalinism and anticommunism. Those who did, however, were often angry with and aggressive toward those who, they believed, out of blindness, stupidity, or lack of patriotism, remained in league with the Soviets. The ardor with which Sidney Hook attacked “fellow travelers” and with which Kallen attacked “totalitarian” unified science was soon matched by the hardball anticommunism that J. Edgar Hoover, Senator Joseph McCarthy, and other professional anticommunists played in the public domain. Beginning in the late 1940s, they attacked intellectuals, politicians, and scientists whom they believed were engaged one way or another in Soviet espionage. There was no mere parallel between the anticommunist crusades of McCarthy and the FBI, on the one hand, and the “antitotalitarian” agenda of Hook, Kallen, and other intellectuals. State and federal policies and laws designed to combat communism affected nearly all major research universities and made it practically impossible, without genuine risk to one’s professional and social standing, to be sympathetic to Marxism or socialism either inside or outside the classroom.

In these and other ways, an intellectual and political culture that first warmly received the Unity of Science movement in the 1930s turned against it and thus helped to guarantee that, despite the efforts of Frank,
it would never regain momentum in the postwar world. Several factors 
and pressures came together to achieve this result. One was the fact that 
unified science was a popular goal. It was not exclusively logical empiri-
cism’s. Some version of the unity of science thesis was shared by Marxists 
of all stripes, with the result that the topic and its practical goal was more 
“pink” during the Cold War than the decades before. Another factor 
concerns professionalization and the goal of cultivating core problems 
and methods that would define, legitimize, and preserve a place for phi-
losophy of science in Cold War academic culture. A third is widespread 
rejection of “collectivism” by intellectuals across the disciplines and the 
celebration of “individualism” and liberty in politics and social theory. 
The values and methods of the Unity of Science movement were sim-
ply out of step with the medley of anticommunist, anticollectivist, and 
antiscientific themes that dominated Cold War America. At the many 
universities that required faculty to sign patriotic loyalty oaths, anticom-
munism was not merely a mood or attitude, but rather an official feature 
of institutional life and work.

One reason the effects of campus anticommunism on philosophy of 
science and other disciplines have remained obscure is that the social 
and institutional mechanisms in play are hardly noble or admirable. It is 
easy to defend the personal integrity of many of the philosophers treated 
here, but it is not easy to defend the behavior of the philosophical and 
academic professions as a whole during the McCarthy years. The AAUP 
and APA were anemic in their efforts to defend philosophers attacked by 
anticommunists and dismissed from their jobs (McCumber 1996; 2001). 
As a whole, the academy and higher education engaged in something like 
an orgy of patriotic conformism that will offend even casual supporters 
of late twentieth-century political correctness:

Professors and administrators ignored the stated ideals of their calling and 
overrode the civil liberties of their colleagues and employees in the service 
of such supposedly higher values as institutional loyalty and national security. 
In retrospect, it is easy to accuse these people of hypocrisy…but most of the 
men and women who participated in or condoned the firing of their contro-
versial colleagues did so because they sincerely believed that what they were 
doing was in the nation’s interest. Patriotism, not expedience, sustained the 
academic community’s willingness to collaborate with McCarthyism. . . . When, 
by the late fifties, the hearings and dismissals [at colleges and universities] ta-
pered off, it was not because they encountered resistance but because they 
were no longer necessary. All was quiet on the academic front. (Schreckeri 
1986, 340–41)
The few academics who remain living to recall these upheavals do so not often, nor with relish. Judging from secondary accounts and memoirs (such as Sidney Hook’s (1987)), many wounds never healed and scores were still being settled in the 1990s. Those in the profession who had conversations in the early 1950s with FBI agents about the patriotism of certain philosophers – including Carnap, Frank, William Malisoff, and Albert Blumberg – probably hoped that these conversations would remain unknown.19

Finally, one of the most remarkable recent discoveries about Cold War intellectual life is that not all of the pressures of anticommunism were negative, repressive, and prohibitionary. To complement Schrecker’s pioneering study of academic anticommunism, Frances Stonor Saunders has explored the positive rewards of anti-Stalinism for intellectuals and artists who participated in the long-running Congress for Cultural Freedom. This institution of the “cultural Cold War” was waged jointly by a handful of influential American and European scholars (including, for a while, Sidney Hook) and U.S. government experts in military intelligence. Combining the brains of Sidney Hook, Daniel Burnham, and other anti-Stalinist intellectuals with the financial brawn of the CIA and major philanthropic organizations, organizers of this congress generously sponsored anticommmunist liberalism throughout Europe and Asia in the form of publications, conferences, and exhibitions.

To the Icy Slopes of Logic

The following chapters together examine how, in light of these various pressures and circumstances, logical empiricism took the apolitical, technical, and professional form it had taken by the end of the 1950s. The main event in this transformation is the death of the Unity of Science movement. What survived the Cold War was logical empiricism without Neurath’s Unity of Science movement, a logical empiricism stripped of the points of contact it had begun to cultivate in the United States with scientists, the public, and with other progressive, liberal movements. By the late 1950s, we see below, leading philosophers of science typically distanced philosophy of science proper from normative concerns of ethics and politics using arguments and suppositions that would not have gone unchallenged by Neurath, Frank, Morris, Dewey, and others in the 1930s.

19 FBI files on these investigations were requested via the Freedom of Information Act.
In the 1960s and after, however, these philosophers were either dead or lacked influence or students willing to carry their torches into the profession’s future.

It is at this point in the story of logical empiricism that celebrated arguments of Kuhn and Quine need to be reconsidered and recontextualized. This book does not undertake this task, but it suggests some general parameters. Briefly, it suggests that these critiques became possible and trenchant only because logical empiricism had taken the recent course it had. Kuhn complained that the logical empiricist “image of science by which we are now possessed” (Kuhn 1962, 1) was an idealized caricature that did not acknowledge science’s vital connections to laboratory practice and to psychological and sociological dynamics within scientific communities. But Kuhn overlooked or was perhaps unaware of the fact that the program he critiqued in the late 1950s had only recently downplayed the interests of Morris, Neurath, and Frank in science’s connections to social, historical, and economic life and their hopes that these topics would thrive among the discipline’s core issues. As one recent analysis suggests, Kuhn’s celebrated influence is not due to some discovery of connections among science, society, and history to which logical empiricists were simply blind. Rather, the success of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* was arguably due to the kind of relationship it posited between science and society, one that comported well with Cold War innovations in federal funding of science and military research (Fuller 2000).

Quine was correct that a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements was crucial for maintaining the mature, logical empiricist conception of a theory (articulated in Carnap 1939 and 1956, for example) as a formal structure tethered to experience via synthetic propositions. Without this, the structure collapses, as Quine put it, into a metaphorical web whose threads are all, more or less, analytic and synthetic (Quine 1951). But Quine’s criticism that this distinction is corrupt because it cannot be formally specified without moving in a circle assumed that some foundational, noncircular specification is the only adequate kind of specification. An alternative, it would appear, lay in pragmatic approaches of the sort championed, again, by Dewey, Morris, Neurath, and, especially at the time of Quine’s critique, Frank, who was then promoting pragmatism (specifically, Bridgman’s operationism) as a lingua franca for philosophy of science. As Howard Stein commented when recalling an exchange he observed between Carnap and Quine, philosophy of science under Quine became more concerned with the critique of doctrine and less with creating tools (designing languages, in Carnap’s case) whose value is to be
judged at least partly, if not mainly, by their pragmatic utility. However ineffectual or unheard of, the efforts of Frank and Morris, in their own ways, promoted a synthesis of pragmatism and analytic philosophy long before recent attempts.

The Plan of the Book

The chapters that follow are arranged roughly chronologically to create a narrative arc depicting the rise and fall of the Unity of Science movement in North America. To establish background for the claim that political forces helped to drive its downfall, the first chapters document the political and ideological vitality of the movement in Europe and, mainly, in the United States. Chapter 2 introduces the main proponents and organizers of the Unity of Science movement – Neurath, Carnap, Frank, and Morris – along with some political aspects of their work and careers. Chapter 3 surveys the leftist philosophical scene in the 1930s that is explored in subsequent chapters. It also describes the warm reception and healthy collaboration between Neurath’s movement and the influential philosophers and intellectuals working in New York City in the mid-1930s. On the basis of correspondence among Carnap, Morris, Neurath, Nagel, Dewey, and others in the late 1930s, chapters 3 and 4 suggest that first years of the new International Encyclopedia were a short but nonetheless golden age for the movement, a time when American pragmatism and logical empiricism collaborated and together sought to promote liberal, progressive goals for Western culture. As Dewey put it in his first contribution to Neurath’s Encyclopedia, the unity of science was a kind of “social problem” that both groups were dedicated to solving.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 continue to examine the leftist philosophical scene in North America in the 1930s and ’40s. Chapter 5 examines some radical philosophers, mainly Albert Blumberg and William Malisoff, whose careers intertwine with that of logical empiricism, while chapters 6 and 7 explore the leftward regions of that scene, ranging from the radical intellectuals who wrote for Science & Society to openly communist philosophers who far outflanked all these philosophers in their commitments to dialectical materialism and the Communist Party. While these three chapters may be skimmed or skipped by readers who are more interested in the central story of the Unity of Science movement, they document

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20 Stein 1992. For an account of the Cold War’s effects on academic philosophy that traces these effects largely to Quine and his influence, see McCumber 2001.
the proximate, even collegial relations, in some cases, of the movement to radical Marxist intellectuals who, however much they criticized logical empiricism’s methods, shared a devotion to unity among the sciences. In some cases, such as those of Malisoff and British philosopher Maurice Cornforth, these figures reappear in later chapters to be variously rejected and criticized by professional philosophers of science in the 1950s.

Chapter 8 introduces the general intellectual climate of the Cold War and the roots of that climate in the anti-Stalinist conversions of Marxist socialists who once adored the Soviet Union. It also examines emerging anti-intellectualism in Cold War culture, based in part on growing rejection of pragmatism and logical empiricism’s shared scientific approach to understanding values. This values debate, which recurs throughout the central narrative, divides intellectuals according to whether they believe that science and its methods can or cannot answer (or help answer) questions about ethical, social, and political values.

Chapter 9 returns to the interior of the Unity of Science movement to show how one former leftist directed much of his anger and bitterness toward Moscow directly at Neurath and his Unity of Science movement. Horace Kallen’s denunciation of the project as “totalitarian” is explored to help explain both the “communistic” reputation the movement eventually received and Neurath’s eventual marginalization as a philosopher given to authoritarianism in both habit and doctrine. Chapters 10 and 11 then chart a postwar schism between Neurath and Philipp Frank, on the one side, and the majority of their logical empiricist colleagues, on the other. The first explores Neurath’s critique of Carnap’s (and Tarski’s) semantical conception of truth and traces that critique to Neurath’s hopes that philosophy of science and the Unity of Science movement would contribute to cultural and educational reforms involved in postwar reconstruction of Europe. The second documents Neurath’s alliance with Frank, their shared critique of excessively formal, “scholastic” philosophy of science, and Frank’s lifelong effort to promote a philosophy of science in North America as a bridge in higher education between science and the humanities.

The last chapters follow Morris, Carnap, and especially Frank in their various efforts to revive the Unity of Science movement after the war and explore several of the ways that anticommunist pressures opposed them. These pressures can be grouped into three kinds or levels that are described in chapters 12 and 13. The first is anticallectivism in social and economic theory (illustrated here by the immensely popular writings of Friedrich Hayek); the second is anticommunism in popular culture and
on American campuses; and the third consists of personal campaigns directed specifically at these philosophers. Chapter 13 is devoted to examining how Morris, Carnap, and Frank differently experienced these pressures in the form of loyalty oaths, anticommunist investigations undertaken by the FBI, and accusations and complaints from colleagues.

Against this backdrop of anticommunist pressures and dangers, chapter 14 depicts a struggle for dominance among three factions vying to shape the content and style of postwar philosophy of science. These include Frank, with his new Institute for the Unity of Science; Reichenbach, Feigl, and others, who together tended to oppose Frank’s plans and projects in favor of more technical topics and professional protocols; and C. West Churchman, who succeeded Malisoff as editor at *Philosophy of Science*. As shown in chapter 15, Frank eventually lost this contest. His efforts to lead his new Institute for the Unity of Science were encumbered by conflicts with his colleagues, loss of funding, and the decline of his own reputation as a philosopher. Chapter 16 then examines a parallel loss of influence on the part of Charles Morris and his movement away from technical philosophy of science toward social science and the study of values.

With Frank, Morris, and Neurath largely out of the picture, chapter 17 surveys the developments and circumstances marking the final death of the Unity of Science movement and its goals and ambitions within professional philosophy of science. These include the official dissolution of Frank’s Institute, the rechartering of the Philosophy of Science Association, and the connections forged between logical empiricism and government-funded military research epitomized by the RAND Corporation. While some logical empiricists availed themselves of these research opportunities, the chapter shows that a more or less official consensus emerged among the profession’s leader: Matters of ethics, society, and politics are officially outside the boundaries of professional philosophy of science. Despite that demarcation, however, the chapter suggests that logical empiricism’s mature, axiomatic view of knowledge (or theories) shows a sympathy with Cold War dichotomies – as understood by Sidney Hook, for example – between irreconcilable, “absolute” values and ideologies. Cold War Logical empiricism did not take sides in these political battles, but it agreed (in a way) that there were irreconcilable sides to be taken.

Chapter 18 concludes by examining several issues involved in the transformation of philosophy of science described here and deserving of further study or scrutiny. Contextual issues include the rise of the postwar
university and the concomitant decline of unaffiliated “public intellectuals.” More technical issues include contemporary interest in the “disunity of science,” the conventional division between analytic and continental philosophy, and the manner in which the goals and values of the Unity of Science movement should be seen as directly opposed to the “absolutism” that guided Cold War politics and the professionalization of philosophy of science. Had history taken a different path, it is argued, and had the Unity of Science movement and its supporters not been marginalized as they were, the arguments for this general depoliticization would have become at least less representative of the discipline as a whole, if not less simply less convincing.